UNPACKING THE CCI’S FIRST SETTLEMENT ORDER

[Anshika Bhadauria & Abhishek Vishwakarma are final year law students from Symbiosis law School, Noida]

Introduction

The introduction of a settlement and commitment mechanism with the Competition (Amendment) Act of 2023 was a turning point in Indian competition law. On 21 April 2025, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) used those powers for the first time in the matter of Kshitiz Arya and Anr. v. Google LLC and Ors. (Case No. 19 of 2020). The case concerned Google’s conduct in the Android smart TV ecosystem, primarily allegations of an abuse of dominant position as well as anticompetitive conduct, under sections 3(4) and 4 of the Competition Act (herein referred to as “Act”).

The matter related to Google’s contracts with smart TV original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)—including the Television App Distribution Agreement (TADA) and Android Compatibility Commitments (ACC)—which allegedly conditioned the supply of Google’s proprietary apps on OEMs’ acceptance of restrictions on the use of another alternative, or forked Android OS. The Director General (DG) investigated the matter and found that Google’s conduct indicated adverse findings against it under Section 4 of the Act. Afterward, Google filed a settlement application, marking a historic first under the amended legislation.

 

CCI’s Investigation Order and DG’s Findings

The CCI ordered a DG investigation following a complaint lodged by two users of Android Smart TVs. In its initial TADA and the ACC— with Smart TV original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), which placed limiting obligations on these OEMs. These practices were viewed as an abuse of Google’s dominant market position due to several factors:

• The mandatory inclusion of Google’s Play Store with the Android TV operating system, which is tailored for Smart TVs;

• Blocking OEMs from creating, selling, or distributing devices that operate on alternative or modified versions of Android OS (forked versions);

• Stifling competition by not making the Play Store available on other qualifying operating systems and

• Hindering innovation and market entry by restricting OEMs from developing their versions of Android OS.

The DG identified Google as a dominant firm in two key markets: (i) licensable smart TV operating systems and (ii) app stores for Android smart TV OS in India. This dominance arose from the significant extent OEMs used the Android TV OS and their excessive reliance on the Google Play Store for app distribution. Google’s licensing framework created a situation where OEMs could not choose an ecosystem other than Android to enable device functionality and meet consumer demand. The DG indicated that this created an asymmetry in bargaining position, which enabled Google to impose unilateral directions.

Issue 1: Imposition of Unfair Conditions through TADA

The TADA was identified as a principal agreement of concern for the DG. This agreement identifies that OEMs would pre-install the entire suite of Google TV Services (GTVS), including applications such as YouTube, Google Assistant, and the Play Store, and would not hold any option to uninstall or selectively include services. OEMs who did not willingly abide by the were denied Play Store access, which was a critical application. Given these findings, the DG indicated that the conditions were not just restrictive but also violated Sections 4(2)(a)(i) and 4(2)(d) of the Act on the basis that it subverted the autonomy of OEMs and competition was distorted.

Issue 2: Restriction on Technical Development through ACC

Google also forced OEMs to sign the ACC, which, in effect, restricted OEMs from developing or deploying forked or incompatible versions of Android operating systems. The DG found that these restrictive provisions did not apply just to certain smart TV products but actually restricted all of an OEM’s devices. Thus, this type of restrictive clause acted as a blanket restriction that blocked OEM’s ability in some instances to innovate, block some technical progress, and deny market entry for alternative operating systems. These restrictions constitute violations of Sections 4(2)(b)(ii) and Sections 4 (2)(c) and 4(2)(d) of the Act. The combination of ACC and TADA tied OEMs into ecosystem created by Google and prevented them from any experiment which could lead to innovation in the marketplace.

Issue 3: Tying of YouTube with Play Store

Google’s dominance was further firmed by requiring OEMs to bundle YouTube with the Play Store. OEMs were required to display the YouTube app on devices so that it could be accessed easily (for example, where a dedicated button was included on remotes). These requirements define advertising YouTube that is unconnected to the Android operating system. The DG determined that the obligations amounted to “tying” where Google leveraged its app distribution market power (via the Play Store) unfairly and anti-competitively, promoting its position in the online video hosting platform market (YouTube).  This conduct constituted a Section 4(2)(e) of the Act violation in that by proxy of its Play Store market, Google foreclosed competition in adjacent markets, and this reinforced its dominance across these markets.

Google’s Settlement Proposal

After the DG’s report, Google offered a new contractual arrangement, the “New India Agreement," to tackle Issues 1 and 3. Through this arrangement, OEMs received a standalone license to Google’s Play Store and Google Play Services (GPS) with no obligations with respect to app bundling, preferred placement, or app pre-installation. In contrast to TADA, the New India Agreement offered more flexibility to OEMs in determining the user interface for their devices. However, the New India Agreement was not going to replace TADA – it allowed both licensing OEM contracts. OEMs could decide to either go with the bundled (albeit free) TADA or this unbundled (although paid) New India Agreement.

Google also proposed to waive the ACC requirement for devices shipping into India without Google apps in order to resolve Issue 2. By sending letters formally stating that OEMs had the right to use the Pie open-source Android OS (AOSP) or other third-party OS platforms such as Tizen, Roku, or WebOS, Google was attempting to quell OEM concerns about unintentionally violating compatibility requirements while experimenting with competing software platforms.

CCI’s Majority Assessment and the Dissent Note

The Commission largely accepted Google’s settlement proposal, noting especially that the New India Agreement also addressed the Commission’s anticompetitive concerns regarding bundling and pre-installation. The Commission also viewed the waiver of ACC obligations as a significant benefit that could promote innovation by allowing OEMs to try out incompatible versions of Android OS or alternative OS altogether. Finally, the Commission thought that the coexistence of TADA and the New India Agreement gave OEMs more commercial options in exploring their licensing obligations.

The Commitments made by Google under the Settlement were made binding for a duration of five years. The settlement amount of ₹20.24 crores was calculated based on Google’s relevant turnover in the relevant markets. This amount was then adjusted around mitigating circumstances, such as Google’s cooperation during the investigation and that the commitments, and its remedial nature, naturally forward-looking. The amount was further decreased by 15% based on Regulation 6 of the Settlement Regulations, 2024.

Member Anil Agrawal voiced a strong dissent on the Settlement, emphasizing that it did not adequately remedy the DG’s concerns. He stated that the New India Agreement couldn’t coexist with TADA as the TADA-bundling payments with no add-on component- remained intact and free. He found that in this two-tier system, OEMs would have an incentive to remain on TADA solely as a way to not incur additional costs. As a result, this defeats the purpose of a simple corrective measure.

Further, he also pointed out that tying arrangements were only partially addressed, citing TADA’s requirement for OEMs to place dedicated Google app buttons (e.g., YouTube) on their remote controls. He noted that the requirement to place Google buttons and the requisite disclaimers was not dealt with or no longer required in the Settlement, but the DG had called it out in the clear definition of an unrelated supplementary condition in violation of the Act. In his view, the remedies (e.g., waiver letters, reminders of existing flexibility) were nothing more than cosmetic in nature. The remedies did not alter the licensing structure in any meaningful way or provide any competitive space for alternatives to Google services. The structural issues- particularly TADA’s pre-installs- continued to exist.

 

Conclusion and a Way Forward

The Google Android TV case is a watershed moment in Indian competition law because it is the first instance where a settlement mechanism was employed in a digital antitrust investigation. It demonstrates the potential for negotiated and articulate enforcement in the fast-moving, digital environment, but it also exposes the limitations of piecemeal remedies at the outset of the case. The dissenting opinion also cautioned against structural inertia. It noted the dangers associated with focusing on “correcting” anticompetitive behavior while the actual practices at the core of the case remain in place.

Throughout the process, the CCI should find strategic ways to monitor self-remedial measures, incorporate strategic, forward-looking analysis, and engage with international counterparts to allow for actual competition and innovation in India’s digital ecosystem. It should consider developing sector-wide no-regulation guidance related to commissioning OS licensing, bundling, and app store restrictions that will line up with global models such as the EU’s Digital Markets Act, which focuses on ex-ante regulation for Digital Gatekeepers. India's competition policies should align with international best practices to prevent potential jurisdictions from seeking regulatory advantage, e.g., regulatory arbitrage, which leverages more favorable competition regulation or non-regulation modes. This includes international convergence or consistency in joining up licensing arrangements that avoid unnecessary uncoordinated bifurcation or partitioning while fostering interoperability across jurisdictions.